In Re: Johnny Martinez by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-8-2011 
In Re: Johnny Martinez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Johnny Martinez " (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1467. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1467 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
ALD-153        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1538 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  JOHNNY MARTINEZ, 
     Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands  
 (Related to D.V.I. Civ. No. 05-cv-00052) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
March 31, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed :  April 8, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Johnny Martinez petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to 
exercise appellate jurisdiction.  Because that issue remains under consideration by the 
District Court and mandamus is not otherwise warranted, we will deny the petition. 
I. 
  Martinez pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and is serving a sentence of 
forty-five years in prison imposed by the Virgin Islands Territorial Court.  Martinez 
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challenged his conviction by filing a habeas petition, which that court denied.  He then 
appealed to the District Court under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a).  In 2005, the District Court 
remanded the matter to the Virgin Islands Superior Court (as the Territorial Court is now 
known) to determine whether a certificate of probable cause should issue.  The Superior 
Court declined to decide that question, and the District Court remanded the matter again 
in 2008 and closed the appeal. 
 While the matter remained pending in the Superior Court on remand, Martinez 
filed a motion in the District Court to “suspend” the probable cause requirement of V.I. 
R. App. P. 14(b).  By order dated November 3, 2010, the District Court concluded that 
the motion required it to determine whether it will retain appellate jurisdiction after the 
Superior Court’s ruling or, conversely, whether port-remand jurisdiction is now vested in 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court instead.1
The District Court later addressed various motions and amended the briefing 
  The District Court concluded that it would 
retain appellate jurisdiction and directed the Clerk to reopen the matter.  On November 4, 
2010, the District Court directed the parties to brief (1) the issue of its appellate 
jurisdiction, and (2) whether it should certify its ruling on that issue to this Court for 
immediate appeal.   
                                                 
 1 The Virgin Islands legislature has created a Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, 
and appeals from the Superior Court that formerly would have been taken to the District 
Court now are taken to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  See Pichardo v. Virgin Islands 
Comm’r of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2010).  As explained below, the question of 
whether the District Court retains post-remand jurisdiction in this case is not currently 
before us. 
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schedule.  Then, on January 4, 2011, it entered sua sponte an order that reads in its 
entirety:  “It is hereby ORDERED that the Order entered November 3, 2010, which held 
that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal post-remand, and further 
ordered that the Clerk of the Court reopen this matter, is VACATED.”  (Docket No. 68.)  
That order was followed by a “text only” docket notation that an “order dismissing case” 
had been entered.  (Docket No. 69.)  Martinez filed a notice of appeal from the January 4 
order and the appeal was assigned C.A. No. 11-1169. 
On January 21, 2011 (the same day Martinez’s appeal was docketed in this Court), 
a notation was placed on the District Court docket stating as follows:  “DOCKET 
ENTRY NO. 69, dismissing this matter was inadvertently entered, due to clerical error.  
This case remains under consideration by the Appellate Division of the District Court.”  
(Docket No. 72.)  Thereafter, this Court notified the parties that it would consider 
whether the appeal at C.A. No. 11-1169 should be dismissed for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction.  Martinez filed a response asserting that this Court has jurisdiction under the 
collateral order doctrine.  He also filed, in the alternative, the mandamus petition at issue 
here.  In that petition, Martinez requests a writ of mandamus directing the District Court 
to exercise post-remand appellate jurisdiction over the denial of his habeas petition.  
After Martinez filed his appeal, the Superior Court finally issued a certificate of probable 
cause, and the District Court has since amended the briefing schedule and scheduled 
Martinez’s appeal for further consideration on May 13, 2011.  (Docket No. 78.)  
  
4 
 
II. 
The first issue we must address is whether we have appellate jurisdiction over the 
District Court’s January 4 order.  We conclude that we do not.  Subject to exceptions not 
relevant here, our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. §1613a(c) is limited 
to reviewing the “final decisions” of the District Court.2
In this case, the District Court’s January 4 order states merely that its earlier order 
of November 3 was “vacated.”  The District Court’s reason for entering the January 4 
order is not entirely clear, but what is clear is that it neither terminated the case nor ruled 
on its appellate jurisdiction.  Instead, the January 4 order does not address the District 
Court’s jurisdiction, and the District Court subsequently amended the briefing schedule 
and scheduled Martinez’s appeal for further consideration.  Thus, both the District 
Court’s jurisdiction and Martinez’s appeal itself remain under consideration by the 
District Court.  For that reason, we are entering an order contemporaneously herewith 
  A final decision “ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing . . . to do but execute the judgment.”  Hodge, 
359 F.3d at 318 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Under the collateral 
order doctrine, an otherwise non-final decision may be deemed final if, among other 
things, it conclusively determines a disputed question.  See id. at 319.  
                                                 
 2 Our jurisdiction to review orders of the Virgin Islands District Court lies under 
48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c), but “our cases have uniformly held that 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) has 
the same requirements for appealability as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 317 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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dismissing Martinez’s appeal at C.A. No. 11-1169.3
One final matter warrants mention.  Some seven years have passed since the 
Territorial Court denied Martinez’s habeas petition and the merits of that ruling have yet 
 
For much the same reason, we will deny his mandamus petition.  Mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy that we may grant only when the petitioner has a clear right to 
relief and no other adequate means to obtain it.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 
(3d Cir. 1996).  It is not available when the petitioner can obtain adequate relief on 
appeal.  See id.  In this case, Martinez seeks a writ of mandamus solely to compel the 
District Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the denial of his habeas petition.  In 
other words, he seeks a legal ruling that the District Court in fact has such jurisdiction.  
He apparently does so in the alternative to an appeal on the mistaken belief that the 
District Court already has decided otherwise.  As explained above, however, briefing on 
the issue is ongoing and the issue remains open, as does the possibility that the District 
Court might certify its jurisdictional ruling for immediate appeal.  Martinez has not 
alleged any excessive delay in resolving the issue or any other circumstance that might 
render his appellate remedy inadequate, and we discern none.  Accordingly, we will deny 
the mandamus petition.  Martinez’s motion for counsel in this Court is denied as well. 
                                                 
 3 The “text only” docket notation of January 4, 2011 (Docket No. 69) might have 
suggested that the January 4 order (Docket No. 68) was final, but the notation was later 
corrected by the docket notation of January 21, 2011 (Docket No. 72).  We need not 
consider whether the January 21 notation constitutes the correction of a “clerical error” in 
an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) because the January 21 notation refers only to the 
January 4 notation, which is separate from and not part of the January 4 order from which 
6 
 
to be addressed on appeal.  Martinez has not sought mandamus relief on the basis of this 
delay, and we presently have no occasion to address it.  We note, however, that there is 
no reason for the delay to continue.  The Superior Court now has granted a certificate of 
probable cause, the District Court has issued a briefing schedule, and the proceeding 
otherwise appears to be on track.  We are confident that the District Court will resolve the 
issues before it in due course.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Martinez appeals.  
